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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PIRACY IN THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA
David Rosenberg
Piracy is an ancient, persistent, and elusive phenomenon in the South ChinaSea. In the past two decades it has increased substantially, leading to a re-
newed interest in piracy and its possible nexus with maritime terrorism, espe-
cially after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Although it has
been widely reported and investigated, piracy remains difficult to understand
and to control. The oceans are “a domain increasingly beyond governmental
control,” says William Langewiesche. They are “vast and wild, where laws of na-
tions mean little and where the resilient pathogens of piracy and terrorism
flourish.”1 In the Asia-Pacific region, “maritime disorder prevails,” observes Sam
Bateman. “This includes unregulated pollution of the marine environment,
over-fishing, marine environmental degradation and
widespread illegal activities at sea.”2
This article attempts to analyze piracy through the
perspective of political economy, with an emphasis
on state and market stakeholders and on the eco-
nomic, technological, and institutional factors af-
fecting ocean governance of piracy. The major area
of concern here is the South China Sea, where ap-
proximately half of the world’s reported incidents of
piracy have taken place since the 1990s. Following
the usage of the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), this estimate includes instances of both pi-
racy as defined under international law—theft on the
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high seas—and armed robbery or theft in the territorial waters or ports of
coastal states.3
This article will examine the scope and trends in piracy in the South China
Sea as well as the factors that motivate this form of maritime crime. It continues
with an analysis of the factors that impede antipiracy efforts, including uncer-
tainties over definitions and legal jurisdiction, the underlying dynamics of pi-
racy, and uncoordinated efforts at detection, pursuit, arrest, and conviction of
pirates as well as recovery of crew, cargo, or ships. It concludes with an analysis
of the limited progress made by state and market stakeholders to improve
antipiracy security in the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea.
MARITIME TRADE AND SHIPPING TRAFFIC
The most important factor affecting piracy and government efforts to interdict
pirates is the dramatic increase in shipping traffic. Maritime trade through the
South China Sea has expanded rapidly in recent years, due to three major,
long-term trends: the high growth rates of regional economies and increasing
trade flows among them, rising energy demand and energy imports, and the au-
tomation of cargo handling in hub ports.
Seaborne trade has doubled every decade since 1945, and shipbuilding ton-
nage worldwide has doubled since 1990. It is estimated that 80 percent of all
world trade, or about 5.7 billion tons of cargo, is transported by sea. This mari-
time superhighway in the world economy is supported by a massive infrastruc-
ture, including ninety-three thousand merchant vessels with 1.25 million
seamen bound for eight thousand ports.4
Intra-Asian trade is growing more quickly than transpacific trade. For exam-
ple, in 2003 South Korea’s trade with China surpassed its trade with the United
States for the first time. In 2004, Japan’s trade with China surpassed its trade
with the United States for the first time. More and more Asian states are reori-
enting their trade flows toward China. The several explanations for this trend in-
clude the recovery of Asian economies from the 1997 economic crisis, the
dynamic China market, and trade-opening agreements between China and
Southeast Asia.5
Asian countries had the largest share of the total tonnage of seaborne world
exports in 2006, at 38.8 percent. Exports of crude oil from western Asia and
manufactured goods from China and other countries of East and Southeast Asia
contributed to this result. European countries accounted for 21.8 percent of
world export tonnage, with the major share coming from countries belonging to
the European Union. Industrialized countries in North America and developing
countries in the Americas made up 21.1 percent of world export tonnage; the
latter accounted for about two-thirds of the total tonnage for the hemisphere,
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owing to their considerable exports of crude oil, iron ore, coal, and grains. Af-
rica’s and Oceania’s shares of overall world tonnage exported were 8.5 percent
and 8.8 percent, respectively.6
Of the world’s twenty busiest container-handling ports in the past five years,
Asian ports accounted for the top six: Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai,
Shenzhen, Busan, and Kaoshiung. The top twenty busiest global ports generally
also include Port Kelang and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, Tanjungpriok in In-
donesia, Laem Chabang in Thailand, and Manila in the Philippines.7 The rapid
growth of maritime trade has created enormous pressures for hub ports and
shipping companies to speed up shipping traffic. Port managers and shipping
companies have tried to accelerate shipping traffic flows, including container-
ization, automation of cargo handling, and increased ship sizes.
Oil tanker traffic—already high—will increase substantially with the pro-
jected increase in Chinese oil imports. Almost all of this additional Asian oil de-
mand, as well as Japan’s oil needs, will be imported from the Middle East and
Africa. Most tankers pass through the strategic Malacca Strait into the South
China Sea. About sixty-five thousand vessels of all types passed through the
Malacca Strait in 2005.
This rise in shipping has also created a corresponding increase in the risks of
congestion and delay, collision, and crime, including in particular all forms of
piracy, especially in the narrow and shallow choke points of the South China Sea.
Clearly, there is a growing concern among coastal states and user states to ensure
speedy and safe passage through the shipping lanes of the South China Sea. Ef-
forts to halt piracy have been stymied, however, by differing views of what con-
stitutes piracy and as to which countries should have jurisdiction over stopping
it in highly disputed waters.
THE DETECTION, COST, AND PREVENTION OF PIRACY
Despite the problem of defining piracy and determining which stakeholder
should be responsible for stopping it, several widespread generalizations about
piracy set it apart from other maritime activities. These include the link between
growing shipping volume and piracy, economic drivers (such as poverty), the
role of organized crime, and the role that law enforcement agencies on land can
play in stopping piracy.
First, the more the shipping, all things being equal, the more the opportunities
for piracy. As shipping volume and velocity increase, targets of opportunity in-
crease for pirates to seize valuable and accessible cargo from ships in port or at sea.
Globalization has not only accelerated world trade. It has also seen a move to the
use of flag-of-convenience shipping and a privatization of port cargo-handling
services. It is increasingly difficult for port officials to distinguish legal from illegal
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trade, especially among the contents of millions of containers passing through
their ports. All these factors enhance the opportunities for illegal trade in pirated
goods.
Second, “piracy is largely driven by poor economic conditions.”8 “The vast
majority of lower-end piracy . . . is largely motivated by poverty and disenfran-
chisement that afflicts vulnerable targets like fishermen and local traders.”9 Sud-
den and severe impoverishment, especially among marginal coastal seafaring
communities, makes piracy a viable way to meet basic needs. For example, the
big increase in the number of piracy attacks in Indonesia’s waters and ports in
the past ten years may be attributed to its sharp economic downturn and domes-
tic instability in the wake of the 1997 currency crisis. Eric Frecon has inter-
viewed one poor migrant from a poor Indonesian kampong who puts it this way.
“I became a pirate . . . to earn a living. Singapore was rich; we were poor. So, we
went to pillage the areas [around] Singapore.”10
In times of economic hardship piracy is still viable for some traditional mari-
time peoples. This helps to explain why most acts of piracy involve petty theft
from ships in ports or anchorages. According to one study, in 2002, 77 percent of
all attacks occurred in ports.11 Economic duress also makes impoverished fisher-
men more vulnerable to and available for recruitment by entrepreneurial crimi-
nal organizations. Piracy will continue as long as poverty and unemployment
persist.
Third, there is a small but increasing amount of piracy by organized criminal
groups. This may be attributed in large part to the increasingly lucrative cargoes
created by the economic dynamism of the region. There has been some increase
in the kidnapping of crew members for ransom and in theft of bulk cargo. More
attackers are armed, more crew members are injured, and more vessels are being
hijacked. The role of organized crime in large-scale piracy is indicated by the so-
phisticated equipment, skilled labor, and managerial infrastructure necessary to
transfer commodities on a global scale.
Fourth, all maritime piracy begins and ends on land. Whether they are poor
seafarers or criminal gangsters, pirates are recruited and based on shore. Ulti-
mately, their booty must be “fenced” on land. Whatever is taken at sea eventually
arrives at a port. This requires official documentation. In the case of pirated
goods, this means reliable false documentation. Officials have to be persuaded to
look the other way; their corruption is essential to the routine transfer of contra-
band. Hence, effective antipiracy measures need more than maritime security
measures; they also need close coordination with national law enforcement au-
thorities and anticorruption agencies.
How costly is the piracy threat to shipping through the South China Sea?
James Warren of the Asia Research Institute at the National University of
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Singapore has claimed that piracy in the (Southeast Asia) region has cost the
world economy a staggering twenty-five billion U.S. dollars a year.12 Stanley
Weeks notes that “piracy raises insurance rates, restricts free trade, increases ten-
sions between the affected littoral states, their neighbors and the countries
whose flagged ships are attacked or hijacked.”13
Coastal states have been under considerable pressure from user states to pro-
vide safe and secure navigation through the South China Sea, especially in nar-
row choke points such as the Malacca Strait. The coastal states, particularly
Indonesia, have been described in the media as not doing enough to suppress pi-
racy. Also, despite the clear threat that piracy appears to offer, shipowners have
not taken much action to stop it. This is perhaps explained by the high cost of
preventive measures. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), for example, has stated that new security measures to counter
the threat of terrorist attacks will require an initial investment by ship operators
of at least US$1.3 billion and will increase annual operating costs by US$730
million.14
In economic terms, however, the relatively low cost of piracy may not warrant
such expensive preventive measures. A closer examination of the data on piracy
shows that the problem might not be as alarming as sometimes portrayed by the
media, at least not in economic terms. For example, in 2005 over sixty-three
thousand ships sailed through the Malacca and Singapore straits. In the same
year, the IMB reported only twelve cases of actual and attempted attacks on ships
in the straits. Hence, the probability of attack in 2005 was a relatively low 0.019
percent, or nineteen out of a hundred thousand. In 2003, in the heavily traf-
ficked Malacca Strait—frequently referred to as one of the most “pirate infested”
seas of the world—the risk of a transiting ship being attacked was less than 0.001
percent.
Moreover, many of these reported piracy attacks were little more than cases of
petty theft against ships at anchor in port, and most piracy victims are them-
selves poor fishermen and traders. Considering the relatively minor costs, many
shipowners may also be reluctant to report pirate attacks to the authorities or
otherwise assist in the investigation of pirate attacks. Apart from reflecting badly
on the company’s image, reporting a pirate attack may cause the victim vessel to
be detained in harbor for investigation. The cost of such delays—varying from
five to twenty-five thousand U.S. dollars per day—may easily exceed the losses
incurred by a pirate attack. If suspected pirates are arrested, crew members of
the victim ship may be unable or unwilling to bear the expense or risk of testify-
ing at the trial.
Many low-cost antipiracy measures are available, such as equipping the su-
perstructure with proper locks and providing antipiracy training. However,
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shipowners and insurance companies have little economic incentive to imple-
ment antipiracy measures. Contrary to the popular impression from news me-
dia reports, most shipowners have not seen piracy as a menace to international
shipping. Ultimately, “repelling intruders becomes a cost-benefit analysis for
ship-owners.”15 Shipowners and shipping companies don’t adopt antipiracy
measures because they don’t find it worth the cost.
ARREST AND CONVICTION OF PIRATES
Piracy is related to other criminal activity in and around ships and ports, and it
often overlaps other crimes. The arrest and conviction of pirates, smugglers,
drug runners, and terrorists—both politically and economically moti-
vated—are in many ways interconnected. In particular, the proceeds from all of
these crimes eventually end up on land, which means that responsibility for
stopping piracy must ultimately include law enforcement authorities on land.
The range of criminal activity around seaports is extensive, including the
smuggling or illicit import of illegal drugs, contraband, stowaways and aliens,
restricted or prohibited merchandise, and munitions. Metropolitan areas near
major seaports often have the highest rates of motor vehicle theft. Stolen cars
and computers are reported among the most lucrative illegal trade from rich
countries to poor countries.16 Smuggling may also be a precondition for piracy,
by providing the essential goods and services of weapons, speedboats, port ac-
cess, and illegal markets to dispose of pirated goods. Hence, piracy may repre-
sent only one aspect of criminality. Widespread poverty around the Malacca
Strait also generates smugglers, procurers, prostitutes, and other criminals.
Port authorities are understandably more concerned about smuggling and il-
legal imports—the most common maritime crimes—than about piracy. Smug-
gling and illegal importation occur whenever ships unload goods illegally, in
areas where they are prohibited, thereby violating states’ embargo or import
quotas. Hence, embargoed Iraqi oil found its way to energy importers in Asia,
and black-market Marlboro cigarettes evade import duties in many porous
ports. It is possible that a shipper may be unaware of an illegal cargo; that is the
responsibility of the cargo owner or customs broker. Given the rapid speed and
volume of trade flows, it is extremely difficult to detect and detain prohibited
shipments. On the contrary, there are substantial pressures on port authorities
to expedite shipments across their borders, especially in large, hub ports.
Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, links between ter-
rorism and piracy have been extensively examined.17 However, maritime terror-
ist attacks or threats—that is, politically or ideologically motivated attacks
against ships—have been scarce around the South China Sea. Those few that
have occurred were within the territorial waters of coastal states. For example,
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Singapore foiled a terrorist plot in 2002 to hit visiting U.S. Navy vessels using a
small boat rigged with explosives. The most notable maritime attack to date was
carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Superferry 14 in Manila Bay in
February 2004; 116 people were killed or missing and presumed dead. However,
it is not clear whether the attack was primarily motivated by ASG in pursuit of its
political objectives. ASG was later found to have sent an extortion letter prior to
the bombing, suggesting that it had been motivated by economic factors.
There are some notable obstacles to staging a successful terrorist attack in the
South China Sea. Targets are less accessible at sea. A maritime terrorist attack
would require very complex and expensive coordination of efforts. An attack,
even if successful, could be much less visible than a terrorist attack on land. So
far, there have been no terrorist attacks or hijacking attempts in the South China
Sea, compared with dozens of terrorist attacks against churches, hotels, and
other land-based targets. Overall, the probability of a maritime terrorist attack
appears low. However, the total costs of a major blockage of vital sea-lanes like
the Malacca Strait could be huge. Although they have been scarce, terrorist at-
tacks on a ferry or cruise ship might have dramatic public impacts: the low prob-
ability times the high possible cost still makes maritime terrorism a substantial
risk. To date, there has not been a clear relationship between piracy and
terrorism.
Arresting and convicting pirates in the South China Sea is a major concern
for nonregional countries with major shipping and naval interests, such as the
United States, Japan, India, and Australia. They want to maintain freedom of
navigation through the straits and sea-lanes of the South China Sea for oil tank-
ers, containerships, and naval vessels. The South China Sea is the main thor-
oughfare between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and is therefore of
great strategic significance. The United States sends its warships, including air-
craft carriers from its Pacific Fleet, through the South China Sea in support of
military missions in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The South China Sea is
the vital artery that connects America’s prime Asian ally, Japan, with its Middle
East energy suppliers.
Coastal states with extensive coastlines, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet-
nam, and China, mainly want to protect their recently declared sovereign rights
and resource control over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) up to two hundred
nautical miles off their respective coastlines, as provided by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). They have also taken on the
political responsibility for controlling piracy along with their claims of eco-
nomic control in their EEZs. For example, Indonesia will not allow any country
or private security firm to guard international ships passing through the
Malacca Strait on its side of the waterway. Ibnu Hadi, the Director for Asia
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Pacific and Africa Inter-Regional Cooperation at the Indonesian Foreign Minis-
try, has said, “Indonesia will strongly object to any security guard escorting ships
in its waters. Indonesia cannot accept foreign ships escorted by foreign security
guards.”18
Coastal countries also want to assert their sovereign rights to protect tourism,
fisheries, and other environmental resources in their territorial waters and EEZs.
However, many coastal Southeast Asian nations want to share with international
shippers the burden of providing safety of navigation. Overall, this situation
presents a dilemma for user states with high concerns over piracy as to whether
and how to demand accountability from the coastal states with political respon-
sibility for maritime security where international sea-lanes traverse their terri-
torial waters. The dilemma is complicated by other pressing concerns for
countries bordering the South China Sea, such as smuggling, trafficking, poach-
ing, and pollution.
Poaching or illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing is perhaps a more im-
portant concern for coastal states. For centuries, the South China Sea has pro-
vided abundant fisheries offering food security and employment opportunities
for coastal countries. However, as coastal urban populations have grown and as
fishing technology has improved, competition for shared fish stocks has intensi-
fied considerably.
There is massive illegal fishing, in the form of unregistered foreign vessels who
“pirate” the seas. Foreign fishing boats intruding in rich regional fishing grounds
are especially vulnerable and attractive targets for pirates. Eduardo Santos asserts
that pirates in the southern Philippines prey more on marginal fishermen than on
tankers, barges, containerships, or other commercial shipping vessels. They may
not only seize the fish catch; they may also rob ships of their engines, equipment,
cash, and other valuables.19 In May 2004, the director of the North Sumatra Fish-
ery Office estimated that eight thousand fishing boats, or two-thirds of the prov-
ince’s fishing fleet, were not operating, because of the threat of piracy.20 The
Indonesian government has estimated that the country loses four billion U.S. dol-
lars each year due to illegal fishing alone—several times more than the estimated
cost of all pirate attacks worldwide.21
For some South China Sea coastal states, any proposed international coordi-
nation to combat terrorism or piracy is of lower priority than other pressing is-
sues. These include protecting and maintaining control over newly acquired
ocean resources, protecting national security, or protecting bureaucratic inter-
ests. In Indonesia, all three issues may coexist. With a coastline twice as long as
the circumference of the earth, and with no more than a few dozen operating
vessels to patrol its territorial waters, the Indonesian navy and marine police face
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a wide range of problems, including illegal fishing, illegal migration, drug traf-
ficking, smuggling, and marine pollution.
To put this in perspective, there were only 103 incidents of piracy in Indone-
sian waters reported to the IMB in 2002, compared with 1,687 murders, nine
thousand cases of violent theft, and eleven thousand serious assaults on land.22
This means that piracy makes up less than 0.05 percent of Indonesia’s cases of re-
ported crime. As a direct result of these competing demands, antipiracy mea-
sures not surprisingly receive limited funding.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTIPIRACY MEASURES AND BUR-
DEN SHARING
Stakeholder priorities changed substantially after July 2005, when the Joint War
Committee (JWC) of the Lloyd’s Market Association listed the Malacca Strait
and certain areas in the southern Philippines (together with areas such as Iraq,
Lebanon, and Somalia) as “prone to hull war, strikes, terrorism and related per-
ils.” As a result, marine insurance premiums were increased for vessels transiting
these areas despite very strong protests by regional governments and
shipowners. The JWC removed the listing in August 2006 after regional govern-
ments—with the assistance of international organizations and user states—in-
stituted several security measures.
The JWC listing was a catalyst for several antipiracy developments. In 2003,
the thirty-sixth Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial
Meeting had issued a “Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other
Threats to Maritime Security” but had taken little action. Subsequently, the
ASEAN Regional Forum convened a meeting of maritime specialists to coordi-
nate coast-guard action, information exchange, and investigation of piracy re-
ports. Japan’s Anti-piracy Coast Guard Program provided additional antipiracy
technologies and training.
The IMB Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur and the International
Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) Piracy Reporting Center in London stepped
up monitoring and compliance efforts. The IMO made it mandatory for all
oceangoing vessels of three hundred gross tons or more to be equipped with an
Automatic Identification System (AIS) by the end of 2004. The AIS automati-
cally sends and receives such ship information as identity, position, course,
speed, and cargo information to and from other ships, aircraft, and shore instal-
lations, all integrated by satellite links. The IMB has endorsed antipiracy mea-
sures like the Secure-Ship electric fence and ShipLoc, an inexpensive satellite
tracking system designed to locate ships at sea or in port by a tiny transmitter
concealed on board. This would permit long-range identification and tracking
of ships by anyone with authorized Internet access.
R O S E N B E R G 5 1
9
Rosenberg: The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
Singapore has implemented the most forceful measures to address maritime
security threats. It was the first Asian port to join the U.S.-sponsored Container
Security Initiative and has provided sea security teams to escort selected vessels
transiting the Singapore Strait. It has restricted circulation of small craft and fer-
ries within the port area and increased surveillance efforts by installing tracking
devices on all Singapore-registered small boats to identify their locations,
courses, and speeds. Together with Indonesia, it operates a radar tracking system
on Batam Island to identify, track, and exchange intelligence on shipping in the
Singapore Strait.
In 2003, Malaysia and Thailand started coordinated naval patrols along their
joint maritime frontier. Following this, in 2004, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indo-
nesia began coordinated naval patrols in the Malacca Strait, under the code
name MALSINDO. In September 2005, the “Eyes in the Sky” initiative began,
with coordinated air patrols over the strait by the three coastal states. The Philip-
pines, meanwhile, has proposed building on its maritime border patrol exercises
with Malaysia and Indonesia by formalizing a tripartite agreement to exchange
information and intelligence. The increase in coordinated patrol activities has
been accompanied by an increased effort to modernize regional naval and
coast-guard capabilities.
Representatives of the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia have fre-
quently asked shipping companies and the international community to share
the costs of policing the Malacca Strait against pirates. Their requests, however,
are received with little enthusiasm by most international actors involved—with
the notable exception of Japan, which has funded a number of initiatives to pro-
vide training and resources to the law enforcement authorities in the region. Re-
grettably, the states that are most adversely affected by piracy—Indonesia,
Myanmar, Bangladesh—can hardly afford to suppress it, whether financially,
militarily, or politically. In September 2005, Indonesia and the IMO convened a
meeting in Jakarta to discuss safety, security, and environmental protection in
the Malacca and Singapore straits. This assembly recognized the role of burden
sharing between coastal and user states, especially in the use and maintenance of
international straits pursuant to article 43 of UNCLOS (“Navigational and
Safety Aids and Other Improvements and the Prevention, Reduction and Con-
trol of Pollution”).
Following on from this, in February 2006 the United States hosted a meeting
in Alameda, California, that assembled representatives from Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Singapore, Australia, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the
Philippines, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. (China was invited but did
not attend.) While the meeting’s objective was to coordinate potential user-state
contributions to assist the Malacca/Singapore Strait littoral states, little progress
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was made on burden sharing. On the one hand, the littoral states want burden
sharing to include the cost of providing safety and environmental protection
services. On the other hand, international user states view burden sharing as a
means of becoming more directly involved in maritime security measures to ad-
dress piracy and terrorism threats.
In September 2006, Malaysia and the IMO organized a meeting in Kuala
Lumpur of coastal states, major shipping nations, and shipping companies.
Working groups on safety of navigation and maritime security were established
to undertake projects on such issues as the removal of shipwrecks, the establish-
ment of a hazardous and noxious-substance response center, the installation of
AIS transponders on small ships, and the placement of tide, current, and wind
measurement systems.
Substantial voluntary contributions have been made by China and Japan for
these projects. Some have advocated toll-road or user-pays systems to help fund
pollution cleanup and navigational aids. The United States and many shippers,
however, oppose strongly the introduction of any fees. They prefer to see greater
transparency and accountability in any use of funds for maritime safety and se-
curity. They would also like to see Malaysia and Indonesia ratify the Interna-
tional Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 and the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
1988 (known as the SUA Convention).
In addition, these countries are also considering becoming members of the
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which was initiated by Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi of Japan in 2001. Its Information Sharing Center was estab-
lished in Singapore during September 2006. Malaysia and Indonesia indicated
their willingness to participate in this effort but have not yet ratified the agree-
ment, due to sensitivities over national sovereignty.
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS IN CONTROLLING PIRACY
Despite the recent developments in antipiracy efforts and the recent decline in
piracy reports in several areas of the South China Sea, there are some persistent
problems in combating piracy. Long-standing concerns include many unre-
solved overlapping claims and jurisdictional disputes. For example, the Spratly
Islands are claimed by six countries and occupied by three of them. These terri-
torial claims are especially important as anchors for assertions of exclusive eco-
nomic zones around the disputed islands and the oil and natural gas resources
they are thought to contain. With few agreed-upon boundaries in the South
China Sea, countries act largely in their own self-interest. Hence, “the lack of
agreed jurisdiction complicates maritime enforcement, leads to unchecked
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degradation of the marine environment and facilitates illegal activities at sea, in-
cluding possible maritime terrorism.”23
Second, international user states themselves have divergent security priori-
ties. For example, recent policy of the United States in the region has been pri-
marily driven by its global war on terrorism. It aims to achieve “maritime
domain awareness”—the development of a comprehensive picture of every-
thing that moves on the world’s oceans. American security officials want to
“wire” ships so that their locations, courses, speeds, cargoes, registrations, ports
of departure, and ports and times of arrival can be tracked with precision, as in
an air traffic control system.24 Japan, on the other hand, is primarily interested in
antipiracy measures, reflecting its acute vulnerability to any disruption of its
trade and raw materials flows.
A third reason for limited progress is that many coastal states give top prior-
ity to protecting national sovereignty and controlling their recently acquired
EEZ resources. The declaration of EEZs by coastal states has led to numerous
overlapping and multiplying jurisdictional claims and to legal confusion over
the right to exercise innocent passage through territorial seas by warships, the
right to conduct military surveillance activities in the EEZ of a coastal state,
and the arrest authority of states in hot pursuit of pirates in contested waters.
There is general agreement that the exercise of freedom of navigation and
overflight in and above EEZs should not interfere with the rights of the coastal
state. However, there is still disagreement about when overflights become in-
trusive eavesdropping missions to scout the defenses of potential rivals. One
tragic symptom of this disagreement was the collision between a U.S. EP-3 sur-
veillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet over Chinese EEZ waters near
Hainan Island on 1 April 2001, after which a political crisis ensued.
Fourth, antipiracy efforts are also greatly hindered by the “flags of conve-
nience” system of ship registration. It is extremely easy and convenient to
reregister and reflag a ship. According to former IMB director Captain Jayant
Abhyankar, “One simply has to fax information as to a ship’s name, ownership,
tonnage, and dimensions, and a registration will be granted. The information
given is not checked. Once registered, it is free to be hired for trade trans-
port.”25 It is a system of “managed anarchy,” according to Stephen Flynn, for-
mer commander in the U.S. Coast Guard and a writer on maritime security.26
According to the International Transport Workers Federation, the flags of con-
venience condone poor safety, pay, and training standards. A 2001 IMO survey
found over thirteen thousand cases of falsified documents of seafarers, most of
whom were from Indonesia and the Philippines.27 This provides an easy op-
portunity for pirates or hijackers to infiltrate a ship’s crew. Having hijacked a
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ship, they can elude detection by reregistering it at sea for a nominal fee, thus im-
posing a layer of obfuscation against the search for the attackers.
Piracy carried out by organized-crime groups sometimes employs “phantom
ships,” operating under false identities. They may be hijacked or bought in the
salvage market. They can be registered and reflagged after unloading illegal
cargo. Reregistration and safety inspections are cheap, fast, and cursory in sev-
eral jurisdictions. Adding to the problem is the widespread practice of most
maritime shipping services to require payment in hard currency on delivery.
The cash-based, fast-paced, transient nature of shipping makes it an ideal me-
dium of exchange and money laundering for criminal entrepreneurs. At one
time there were thought to be twelve phantom ships operating in Southeast Asia;
all but one of them were registered in Panama or Honduras.28
There are some simple solutions for preventing smuggling or fraudulent sale
of contraband from phantom ships. Every ship has an IMO identification num-
ber, based on its original Lloyd’s registry. That number could be engraved per-
manently in a prominent place, so that any cargo dealer can quickly determine
whether or not a suspicious vessel is in fact a phantom ship. This solution is sim-
ple, cheap, and likely to be highly effective in locating phantom vessels.
Shipowners and shipping companies are responsible for adopting antipiracy
security measures, including relatively cheap physical-security measures like
“safe rooms” and the installation of locks and bolts on cargo holds, in addition
to satellite-based global positioning systems to track their shipments around the
globe. Some shipping companies have invested in antipiracy devices like
ShipLoc or Secure-Ship, or even cheaper methods, such as high-pressure water
hoses or security lights. But most do not, apparently because they calculate that
the risk of loss is not worth the cost of prevention.
Shippers have long-established norms of working outside national bound-
aries. They have to contend with import quotas, embargoes, and restrictions im-
posed by states for political reasons, to the commercial detriment of the shipper.
Shippers may even obtain bigger profits in making prohibited goods available.
In these restricted areas, it may be convenient to shipowners for their vessels to
be out of radio contact or undetectable.
Another persistent problem for combating piracy is institutional insularity. A
good deal of useful information about piracy is contained in the computers and
files of police, coast-guard, customs, immigration, military, intelligence, and
other national authorities. However, even within one national government, “in-
formation is readily available but it is locked away in ‘silos’ or ‘stovepipes’—in-
stitutional frameworks that distribute critical information vertically but not
horizontally.”29 Sharing information horizontally among governments is much
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more difficult. Doing so very quickly—for example, when a suspect ship is first
sighted—is even more difficult.
Hence, a number of factors impede coordinated antipiracy efforts: uncer-
tainties over legal jurisdiction, disputed sovereignty, and uncoordinated efforts
at the recovery of crews, cargoes, or ships. Even when pirates are detected, hot
pursuit across national boundaries has seldom been attempted. When coordi-
nated surveillance (like the recent MALSINDO patrols) has reduced piracy at-
tacks, pirates have generally responded by increasing their attacks in less
protected areas of the region. State and market stakeholders have made only lim-
ited progress in coordinating and sustaining antipiracy security measures for
the vital shipping lanes of the South China Sea.
CONFLICTING CLAIMS, OVERLAPPING INTERESTS
Piracy is often dramatized by the news media, spreading the impression that it is
more of a problem than it really is. Piracy is difficult to define and measure. It
appears to be related to other forms of crime, on land and at sea. Hence, any
antipiracy response must be a coordinated effort—on land and at sea. But this
coordination is difficult to achieve. As a result, there is still no effective gover-
nance, or burden sharing in the provision of security, of the sea-lanes transiting
the South China Sea. Coastal states don’t want to give up any sovereign controls.
Shippers don’t want to impose restrictions or costs on their operations. Major
user states have not offered sufficient support to establish the necessary mea-
sures. The current situation is far from the highly ambitious proposal by the
World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and the IMO to con-
struct a “Marine Electronic Highway,” a shipping traffic control system similar
to the global air traffic control arrangement, with comprehensive, integrated
electronic information, navigation, and control systems.
Whatever their conflicting claims and mutual suspicions may be, political
leaders in the coastal states are beginning to understand that they must cooper-
ate in order to manage the increase in shipping traffic, to use the resources of the
South China Sea sustainably, and to address maritime security threats, including
piracy. While some progress has been made, there is as yet no durable agreement
on how to share the burden for providing safety and security from piracy in the
region. The nation-states of Southeast Asia that have only recently extended
their sovereignty and resource claims to EEZs in the South China Sea are in no
rush to negotiate them away, and shippers who traverse the busiest sea-lanes in
the world are reluctant to impose any stringent or expensive security measures.
All these regional and international stakeholders share many overlapping in-
terests—for example, in promoting safe navigation for commercial shipping.
On antipiracy or antiterrorist enforcement measures, however, they have had
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conflicting views. Littoral states are insistent that the process of achieving re-
gional maritime security should be locally initiated and led. They are willing to
accept external assistance, but they contend that ultimately they must have the
authority and capability to provide that security. For example, Tokyo’s financial
contributions, technical assistance, and joint training are welcomed by the litto-
ral states. These measures not only increase the pool of available resources for
maritime security but also diversify sources of assistance, avoiding sole reliance
on the United States. However, regional states and shippers have yet to put aside
their individual stakeholder interests and then negotiate and implement an ef-
fective regional maritime antipiracy security system. Unfortunately, it may take
an event equivalent to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, a
spectacular collision, or a devastating oil spill to overcome contending stake-
holder interests and institutional inertia and to galvanize the political will
needed for effective antipiracy security measures.
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